Robust Stochastic Stackelberg Differential Reinsurance and Investment Games for an Insurer and a Reinsurer with Delay

This paper investigates the asset-liability management problem for an ordinary robust insurance system between a reinsurer and an insurer under the Heston model with delay. The reinsurer, as the leader of the Stackelberg game, can price reinsurance premium and invest its wealth in a financial market that contains a risk-free asset and a risky asset whose price process is described by the Heston model. The insurer, as the follower of the Stackelberg game, can purchase proportional reinsurance from the reinsurer and invest in the same financial market. Under the consideration of the performance-related capital inflow/outflow, the wealth processes of the insurer and reinsurer are modeled by stochastic differential delay equations (SDDEs). This paper aims to find the equilibrium strategies for the reinsurer and insurer by maximizing the expected utility of the player’s terminal wealth with delay under the worst-case scenario of the alternative measures. By using the idea of backward induction and dynamic programming approach, the explicit expressions of the robust equilibrium strategies and value functions are derived. Finally, some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis to illustrate the effects of model parameters on the robust optimal reinsurance and investment strategies are performed.