Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Risk-Sensitive Cost

被引:0
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作者
Anup Biswas
Subhamay Saha
机构
[1] Indian Institute of Science Education and Research,Department of Mathematics
[2] Indian Institute of Technology,Department of Mathematics
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关键词
Stochastic differential games; Risk-sensitive payoff; Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equations; Saddle point strategy; Verification result; Primary: 91A15; Secondary: 91A23; 49N70;
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摘要
Zero-sum games with risk-sensitive cost criterion are considered with underlying dynamics being given by controlled stochastic differential equations. Under the assumption of geometric stability on the dynamics, we completely characterize all possible saddle point strategies in the class of stationary Markov controls. In addition, we also establish existence-uniqueness result for the value function of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation.
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页码:113 / 140
页数:27
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