The Asymmetric Information Problem in Taiwan's Cancer Insurance Market

被引：0
|
作者：
Kili C Wang
Jin-Lung Peng
Yi-Yun Sun
Yao-Chia Chang
机构：
[1] Tamkang University,Department of Insurance
[2] Risk and Insurance Research Center,Department of Risk Management and Insurance
[3] College of Commerce,undefined
[4] National Chengchi University,undefined
[5] National Chengchi University,undefined
[6] Graduate Institute of Finance and Insurance,undefined
[7] Shih Chien University,undefined
[8] Graduate Institute of Finance and Insurance,undefined
[9] Tamkang University,undefined
来源：
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review | 2011年 / 36卷
关键词：
asymmetric information; adverse selection; cancer insurance;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper investigates the problem of asymmetric information in Taiwan’s cancer insurance market. Through the survey data, we find evidence of adverse selection existing in this market. Furthermore, we collect additional information on the individual, and find that the individual’s family cancer history contains additional valuable information. It can not only more accurately predict the probability of contracting cancer, as well as predict the willingness to purchase extended cancer insurance, but it can also help to mitigate the severity of adverse selection in the insurance market.
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页码：202 / 219
页数：17
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