This article analyzes the effects of pension reform for men and women by comparing the outcomes in the system after reform to the outcomes under the prior system. The authors also study the incentive effects on labor supply. The size of the labor force, however, is also influenced by the rules for retirement, social insurance programs (e.g., sickness insurance and unemployment insurance), collective bargaining agreements, and seniority rules. Using a simulation model, the authors compare women's pension benefits and contributions to those of men in the new Swedish system and in the old. The analysis includes simulating the wage and employment histories of representative men and women and the pension benefits these are likely to generate under the old and new rules. After showing the results of this model, the authors describe and discuss the supplementary pension systems, that is, the negotiated collective agreement schemes and different pathways to retirement. Based on empirical evidence from Swedish and Latin America simulated data, the final section of the article discusses gender impact of pension rules and how to design pension systems to ensure adequate pension benefits for both women and men.