A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

被引：0
|
作者：
Nir Dagan
Oscar Volij
Eyal Winter
机构：
[1]  Academic Priority Ltd.,
[2] Rashi 31,undefined
[3] 52015 Ramat-Gan,undefined
[4] Israel (e-mail: nir@nirdagan.com; http://www.nirdagan.com),undefined
[5]  Department of Economics,undefined
[6] 260 Heady Hall,undefined
[7] Iowa State University,undefined
[8] Ames,undefined
[9] Iowa 50011,undefined
[10] USA (e-mail address: oscar@volij.co.il; http://volij.co.il),undefined
[11]  Department of Economics,undefined
[12] Hebrew University,undefined
[13] Jerusalem 91905,undefined
[14] Israel (e-mail: mseyal@mscc.huji.ac.il. Web site: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~eyalw/),undefined
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2002年 / 19卷
关键词：
Disagreement Point; Bargaining Solution; Rational Alternative; Nash Bargaining Solution; Irrelevant Alternative;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.
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页码：811 / 823
页数：12
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