Intensionality and Epistemic Justification

被引：0

作者：

Patrick Bondy

机构：

[1] McMaster University,Department of Philosophy

来源：

Philosophia | 2013年 / 41卷

关键词：

Epistemic Justification; Reliabilism; Externalism; Intensionality;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

The purpose of this paper is to raise a new objection to externalist process reliabilism about epistemic justification. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional—it does not permit the substitution of co-referring expressions—and reliabilism cannot accommodate that.

引用

页码：463 / 475

页数：12

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