Do self-serving managers choose Chapter 11 filing over out-of-court restructuring?

被引：0

作者：

Kim D.-K. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Finance and International Finance, School of Business, Montclair State University, Montclair

来源：

Journal of Economics and Finance | 2006年 / 30卷 / 1期

关键词：

Abnormal Return; Trade Credit; Financial Distress; Cumulative Abnormal Return; Managerial Ownership;

D O I：

10.1007/BF02834278

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

I investigate whether self-serving managers in financially distressed firms influence a firm's decision on the choice of debt restructuring method. 1 show that there is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and the probability of Chapter 11 filing. I find that distressed firms are more likely to choose Chapter 11 with the increase of managerial ownership when managerial ownership is in the 5% - 25% range. I also find a significant curvilinear relation between managerial ownership and the probability of Chapter 11. My results are consistent with the hypothesis that managerial ownership plays a significant role in corporate decisions.

引用

页码：105 / 114

页数：9