Global alliances effect in coalition forming

Coalition forming is investigated among countries, which are coupled with short range interactions, under the influence of externally-set opposing global alliances. The model extends a recent Natural Model of coalition forming inspired from Statistical Physics, where instabilities are a consequence of decentralized maximization of the individual benefits of actors. In contrast to physics where spins can only evaluate the immediate cost/benefit of a flip of orientation, countries have a long horizon of rationality, which associates with the ability to envision a way up to a better configuration even at the cost of passing through intermediate loosing states. The stabilizing effect is produced through polarization by the global alliances of either a particular unique global interest factor or multiple simultaneous ones. This model provides a versatile theoretical tool for the analysis of real cases and design of novel strategies. Such analysis is provided for several real cases including the Eurozone. The results shed a new light on the understanding of the complex phenomena of planned stabilization in the coalition forming.