A strongly secure pairing-free certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol under the CDH assumption基于CDH假设的强安全的无对的无证书认证密钥协商协议

Certificateless authenticated key agreement (CL-AKA) protocols have been studied a great deal since they neither suffer from a heavy certificate management burden nor have the key escrow problem. Recently, many efficient CL-AKA protocols without pairings have been built. However, these pairing-free CL-AKA protocols are either not proved in any formal security model or proved under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption, a non-standard and strong assumption. With available implementation technologies, pairings are needed to realize the GDH assumption, which means that these pairing-free CL-AKA protocols are not pure pairing-free. Furthermore, these protocols are insecure in the strengthened eCK (seCK) model, which encompasses the eCK model and considers leakages on intermediate results. In this paper, we present a pure pairing-free CL-AKA protocol, which is provably secure in the seCK model under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Compared with the existing CL-AKA protocols, the proposed protocol has advantage over them in security or efficiency.