Banning Bidders from All-pay Auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Domenico Menicucci
机构：
[1] Università degli Studi di Firenze,Dipartimento di Matematica per le Decisioni
来源：
Economic Theory | 2006年 / 29卷
关键词：
All-pay auction; Complete information; Exclusion principle; D44; D82;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We consider an all-pay auction with complete information among the bidders; the seller does not observe the bidders’ values. We show that for some information structures in which the seller has a small uncertainty about the valuations, it is profitable for him to exclude from the auction all but two (randomly selected) bidders even though the latter are ex ante identical from his point of view.
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页码：89 / 94
页数：5
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