The evolution of donators in a common-pool resource problem

被引：0
|
作者：
Dara Curran
Colm O’Riordan
Humphrey Sorensen
机构：
[1] University College Cork,Department of Computer Science
[2] National University of Ireland,Department of Information Technology
来源：
Artificial Intelligence Review | 2007年 / 27卷
关键词：
Evolutionary computation; Cooperation; Foraging; Common pool resource problems; Artificial life;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Issues regarding foraging in groups have been addressed and researched in a range of domains. Questions arise regarding the benefits to the group as a whole and the cost placed upon individual group members. In this paper, we model the foraging problem as a common resource pool problem and evolve populations in a range of scenarios. In these simulations, agents (group members) forage for food, may contribute to a common pool resource and may benefit from this group resource. We present and discuss results illustrating the scenarios under which agents evolve to behave for the common good of the group and its effect on the survival and the fitness of the population.
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页码：245 / 256
页数：11
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