Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

被引：0
|
作者：
Axel Gautier
Nicolas Petit
机构：
[1] University of Liege,HEC Liege, LCII
[2] CORE,Faculty of Law, LCII
[3] UCL,undefined
[4] CESifo,undefined
[5] University of Liege,undefined
[6] University of South Australia (UniSA),undefined
来源：
European Journal of Law and Economics | 2018年 / 45卷
关键词：
Competition policy; European Commission; Commitments; Law enforcement; K21; K41; L40;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the the European Commission to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ 41(2):255–282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under the standard infringement procedure.
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页码：195 / 224
页数：29
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