Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction

被引：0
|
作者：
Ricardo Gonçalves
Indrajit Ray
机构：
[1] Universidade Católica Portuguesa,Católica Porto Business School and CEGE
[2] Cardiff University,Economics Section, Cardiff Business School
来源：
Review of Economic Design | 2024年 / 28卷
关键词：
Japanese–English auctions; Wallet game; Discrete bids; Partitions; Pooling equilibrium; Separating equilibrium; Seller’s revenue; C72; D44;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We consider the set-up of a Japanese–English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Gonçalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177–179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.
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页码：125 / 150
页数：25
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