The institutional failures of International Monetary Fund conditionality

被引:0
|
作者
Allegret J.-P. [1 ]
Dulbecco P. [2 ]
机构
[1] École Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines GATE-CNRS, University of Lumière Lyon 2, Bureau R131 15, 69342 Lyon cedex 07, Parvis René Descartes
[2] University of Auvergne Clermont 1, CERDI, 63000 Clermont Ferrand
关键词
Conditionality; Institutional changes; International Monetary Fund; Public choice;
D O I
10.1007/s11558-006-9003-9
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. The IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. The institutional failures of IMF conditionality are appreciated at two complementary levels: (a) its intrinsic bureaucratic bias, and (b) the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes. A new approach of conditionality suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process. © 2006 Springer Science + Business Media, LLC.
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页码:309 / 327
页数:18
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