Minds, Machines and Turing

被引:33
|
作者
S. Harnad
机构
[1] University of Southampton,Department of Electronics and Computer Science
[2] Highfield,undefined
关键词
cognitive neuroscience; cognitive science; computation; computationalism; consciousness; dynamical systems; epiphenomenalism; intelligence; machines; mental models; mind/body problem; other minds problem; philosophy of science; qualia; reverse engineering; robotics; Searle; symbol grounding; theory of mind; thinking; Turing; underdetermination; Zombies;
D O I
10.1023/A:1008315308862
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Turing's celebrated 1950 paper proposes a very generalmethodological criterion for modelling mental function: total functionalequivalence and indistinguishability. His criterion gives rise to ahierarchy of Turing Tests, from subtotal (“toy”) fragments of ourfunctions (t1), to total symbolic (pen-pal) function (T2 – the standardTuring Test), to total external sensorimotor (robotic) function (T3), tototal internal microfunction (T4), to total indistinguishability inevery empirically discernible respect (T5). This is a“reverse-engineering” hierarchy of (decreasing) empiricalunderdetermination of the theory by the data. Level t1 is clearly toounderdetermined, T2 is vulnerable to a counterexample (Searle's ChineseRoom Argument), and T4 and T5 are arbitrarily overdetermined. Hence T3is the appropriate target level for cognitive science. When it isreached, however, there will still remain more unanswerable questionsthan when Physics reaches its Grand Unified Theory of Everything (GUTE),because of the mind/body problem and the other-minds problem, both ofwhich are inherent in this empirical domain, even though Turing hardlymentions them.
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页码:425 / 445
页数:20
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