Earnings forecast disclosure regulation and earnings management: Evidence from Taiwan IPO firms

被引:29
|
作者
Jaggi B. [1 ]
Chin C.-L. [2 ]
Lin H.-W.W. [3 ]
Lee P. [4 ]
机构
[1] Faculty of Management, School of Business, Rutgers University, Piscataway
[2] Department of Accounting, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei
[3] Department and Graduate Institute of International Business, National Taiwan University, Taipei
[4] Department of Accounting, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, New York
关键词
Disclosure regulation; Discretionary accruals; Earnings management; Forecast error threshold; Mandatory earnings forecasts;
D O I
10.1007/s11156-006-7434-2
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This study examines whether the Taiwanese regulation requiring disclosure of earnings forecasts in the IPOs resulted in disclosure of more optimistic earnings forecasts and whether the forecast error was reduced more by manipulating the reported earnings rather than revising the earnings forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. The study is based on 759 forecasts issued by the Taiwanese IPO firms from 1994 to 2001, i.e. 8-year period after the regulation was modified to increase the forecast error threshold to 20%. The findings show that the disclosure regulation resulted in more optimistic forecasts than conservative forecasts, especially for firms expecting better performance in the forecast year compared to the previous year. Firms disclosing optimistic earnings forecasts engaged more in manipulation of reported earnings than revision of forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. These findings thus suggest that the disclosure regulation resulted in earnings manipulation, which reduced the quality of reported earnings. © Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006.
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页码:275 / 299
页数:24
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