Asymmetric Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking: Comparison of Two Contest Structures

被引:0
|
作者
William E. Stein
Amnon Rapoport
机构
[1] Texas A&M University,Department of Information & Operations Management
[2] University of Arizona,Department of Management and Policy
来源
Public Choice | 2004年 / 118卷
关键词
Public Finance; Equilibrium Solution; Group Expenditure; Contest Structure;
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摘要
Two variations of a two-stage rent-seeking contest areconsidered. In the first stage of the Between-Groupmodel, groups compete through the expenditure of resources bytheir members. Based on group expenditures, one winning groupis probabilistically determined. On the second stage, membersof the winning group compete with one another for an exogenousprize. In the Semi-Finals model a player is chosen fromeach group and then these players compete for the prize.Groups differ in size or in their valuation of the prize.Subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions are constructed forthese two contest structures.
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页码:151 / 167
页数:16
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