Corporate governance and employee treatment: evidence from takeover defenses

被引:0
|
作者
Unsal O. [1 ]
Rayfield B. [2 ]
机构
[1] Girard School of Business, Merrimack College, 315 Turnpike St., North Andover, 01845, MA
[2] Scott College of Business, Indiana State University, Federal Hall 30 N. 7th St., Terre Haute, 47809, IN
关键词
CEO pay; CEO tenure; Labor law; Labor litigation;
D O I
10.1007/s12197-019-09478-4
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In this study, we use a unique hand-collected dataset of employee lawsuits to understand the effect of litigation on CEO turnover. We gather 28,258 employee disputes (after initial court hearing) dating between the years 2000 and 2014 to test the relationship between executive turnover following employee allegations. We find increased turnover of CEOs following labor lawsuits. Additional analysis suggests that, following the lawsuits, CEO compensation decreases and becomes more sensitive to cash holding. Our results show that employee lawsuits have an impact on CEO turnover, regardless of the case outcome or motivation. Overall, we document the importance of employee treatment in the workplace. We conclude employee treatment may impact both the tenure and future job prospects of a CEO. © 2019, Academy of Economics and Finance.
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页码:361 / 391
页数:30
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