On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers

被引:0
|
作者
Gorkem Celik
Serdar Sayan
机构
[1] University of British Columbia,Department of Economics
[2] TOBB University of Economics and Technology,Department of Economics
[3] Ohio State University,Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics
来源
Review of Economic Design | 2008年 / 12卷
关键词
Corruption; Law enforcement; K42; D73; D78; D82;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes with the level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal.
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页码:209 / 227
页数:18
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