Anticipating Dissent: The Repression of Politicians in Pinochet's Chile

Dictators can choose not only whether to repress but also how to repress. This paper demonstrates that autocrats select their repressive methods based on the anticipated likelihood of responsive dissent. While dictators would prefer to use violence against their most prominent opposition, the more visible the opponent, the more likely their death or detention will provoke backlash. Instead, dictators can target these enemies with alternative methods of repression like exile. To test this theory, I draw on original data on the fates of candidates in the last elections before Chile's coup. While elected politicians experienced more repression when accounting for exile, results-including those of a regression discontinuity-demonstrate that election decreased the likelihood of suffering violence. Evidence suggests that this is due to the increased prominence associated with winning office. My findings offer new insight into how autocrats avoid backlash, as well as when they adopt different repressive tools.