Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result

被引：72
|
作者：
Alcalde, Jose [1 ,2 ]
Dahm, Matthias [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Alicante, IUDESP, E-03071 Alicante, Spain
[2] Univ Alicante, Dep Econ, E-03071 Alicante, Spain
[3] Univ Rovira & Virgili, Dep Econ, Tarragona 43204, Spain
来源：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 94卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
(Non-)deterministic contest; All-pay auction; Contest success functions; ALL-PAY AUCTION; SOCIAL COSTS; SUCCESS FUNCTIONS; MONOPOLY POWER; CONTESTS; EQUILIBRIUM; EXISTENCE; GAMES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.11.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might Value the prize differently We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class Of Contest Success functions fulfilling several properties The main properties are anonymity and a condition oil the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs In this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds Our results imply a partial robustness result for the all-pay auction (C) 2009 Elsevier B V All rights reserved.
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页码：1 / 7
页数：7
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