On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms

被引：1
|
作者：
Chen, Yajing [1 ]
Jiao, Zhenhua [2 ]
机构：
[1] East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Business, Shanghai 201620, Peoples R China
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2021年 / 49卷 / 03期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
School choice; Boston mechanism; Top trading cycles mechanism; Strong acyclicity; Kesten-acyclicity; ALLOCATION; STABILITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2021.02.002
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
This paper shows that the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms are equivalent if, and only if, the priority structure is both strongly acyclic and Kesten-acyclic. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：300 / 303
页数：4
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