The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902-1911

被引：3

作者：

Hao, Yu ^{[1
]}

Liu, Zhengcheng ^{[2
]}

Weng, Xi ^{[3
]}

Zhou, Li-An ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Peking Univ, Sch Econ, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China

[2] Univ Hong Kong, Business Sch, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[3] Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY | 2022年 / 82卷 / 03期

关键词：

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; IMPERIAL CHINA; CIVIL; RECRUITMENT; IMPACT;

D O I：

10.1017/S0022050722000225

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam removed. Using anti-elite protests as a proxy for the deterioration of local governance, we find that prefectures with a higher POUM experienced more incidents of anti-elite protests after the abolition.

引用

页码：625 / 662

页数：38