The effect of retaliation costs on employee whistleblowing

被引:15
|
作者
Heese, Jonas [1 ]
Perez-Cavazos, Gerardo [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2021年 / 71卷 / 2-3期
关键词
Employee whistleblowing; Retaliation costs; Labor unemployment insurance; Workplace safety inspections; FIRM; PERCEPTIONS; INFORMATION; GOVERNANCE; GEOGRAPHY; OUTCOMES; BLOWERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101385
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We use large increases in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to study the effects of expected retaliation costs on employee whistleblowing. Increases in UI benefits reduce the costs that arise from a job loss, one of the costliest forms of retaliation. We find that increases in UI benefits increase the number of facility-level employee workplace safety complaints filed with the regulator. Furthermore, UI benefit increases also result in more violations and more penalties. The effects are concentrated in firms where retaliation is more likely as measured by weaker employee relations, internal controls, and monitoring. Our findings show the importance of reducing retaliation costs to tap into employees? knowledge of misconduct. 0 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:19
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