The Problem of the Circle of Method in Ramus, Descartes and Spinoza

The well-known problem of the "beginning of knowledge", posited by Plato in his Meno, takes a singular turn when we assume that knowledge has a vocation to be produced following a method. If that is the case, then one difficulty follows another. The "circle of method" takes the place of Meno's paradox, and one rightly wonders whether it is necessary to proceed - and if it is the only way - in a methodical way to invent a method. Since the Regulae, Descartes labored under the difficulty posed by this question, which Spinoza later dissolved. It remains to be seen whether, contrary to what Spinoza stipulates, and as Descartes claims, a truly inaugural status can be granted to method, and whether something like an authentic "method of invention" is possible. That is when method acquires its modern meaning (which is still our meaning today), provided that we are willing to recognize that this method of invention is not itself invented, but simply recognized as being the "natural method" followed by common sense.