A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe

被引：2
|
作者：
Tasnádi, A [1 ]
机构：
[1] Budapest Univ Econ Sci & Publ Adm, Dept Math, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2000年 / 69卷 / 01期
关键词：
Bertrand-Edgeworth; dominant firm; price leadership;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper extends the Bertrand-Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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页码：63 / 69
页数：7
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