Supply Chain Contracts in the Presence of Gray Markets

Abuse of channel incentives by a manufacturer's authorized retailers often encourages gray markets to emerge, which affects supply chain profit as well as the manufacturer's brand image. Therefore, myopically selecting a product distribution contract can be harmful. We analyze the performance of a number of contracts in the presence of a gray market-primarily wholesale price, revenue sharing, and quantity discounts-and analyze their impact on prices charged, quantity ordered, as well as profits. We also investigate their impact on consumer surplus and social welfare. Our results indicate that selection of an appropriate contract is quite crucial, as different contracts give different results across a variety of operating parameters. Their performance is governed by the relative trade-offs involving diversion of excess quantity to the gray market at the end of the season, an extension of target market due to lower prices in the alternate channel, and the negative impact on the manufacturer's brand that also affects its revenue. We delineate these characteristics and find that, in general, the quantity discount contract performs the worst. Interestingly, if the blowback suffered by the manufacturer on account of product availability in the gray market is high, the wholesale price contract may outperform the other contracts, including the revenue-sharing contract with a truthful retailer, which otherwise is a more attractive option. We discuss the implications of our analysis, and also provide strategies and pointers to manage the impact of gray markets.