CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures

被引：601
|
作者：
Aboody, D
Kasznik, R [1 ]
机构：
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Grad Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 29卷 / 01期
关键词：
CEO stock option awards; voluntary disclosure;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00014-8
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We investigate whether CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around stock option awards. We conjecture that CEOs manage investors' expectations around award dates by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. For a sample of 2,039 CEO option awards by 572 firms with fixed award schedules, we document changes in share prices and analyst earnings forecasts around option awards that are consistent with our conjecture. We also provide more direct evidence based on management earnings forecasts issued prior to award dates. Our findings suggest that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: M41; D82.
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页码：73 / 100
页数：28
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