CEOs and the Product Market: When Are Powerful CEOs Beneficial?

被引：52

作者：

Li, Minwen ^{[1
]}

Lu, Yao ^{[1
]}

Phillips, Gordon M. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

[2] Dartmouth Coll, Tuck Sch Business, Hanover, NH 03755 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 2019年 / 54卷 / 06期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

COMPETITION; FIRM; DIRECTORS; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; GOVERNANCE; PAY;

D O I：

10.1017/S0022109018001138

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine whether industry product market conditions are important in assessing the benefits and costs of chief executive officer (CEO) power. We find that firms are more likely to have powerful CEOs in high demand product markets where firms are facing entry threats. In these markets, investors react favorably to announcements granting more power to CEOs, and CEO power is associated with higher market value, sales growth, investment, advertising, and the introduction of more new products. Our results remain significant when addressing the endogeneity of CEO power by instrumenting CEO power with past non-CEO executive and director sudden deaths.

引用

页码：2295 / 2326

页数：32

共 50 条

[1] Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance
Humphery-Jenner, Mark
Islam, Emdad
Rahman, Lubna
Suchard, Jo-Ann
JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 2022, 19 (01) : 135 - 188
[2] Powerful CEOs and investment efficiency
Chowdhury, Md Raihan Uddin
Xie, Feixue
Hasan, Md Mahmudul
GLOBAL FINANCE JOURNAL, 2023, 58
[3] Powerful CEOs and earnings quality
Shiah-Hou, Shin-Rong
MANAGERIAL FINANCE, 2021, 47 (12) : 1714 - 1735
[4] Geography and the Market for CEOs
Yonker, Scott E.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2017, 63 (03) : 609 - 630
[5] Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
Morse, Adair
Nanda, Vikram
Seru, Amit
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2011, 66 (05): : 1779 - 1821
[6] Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance
Adams, RB
Almeida, H
Ferreira, D
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2005, 18 (04): : 1403 - 1432
[7] Incentive Contracts are not Rigged by Powerful CEOs
Wan, Kam-Ming
CRITICAL FINANCE REVIEW, 2014, 3 (01): : 99 - 152
[8] The market for CEOs: An empirical analysis
Aivazian, Varouj A.
Lai, Tat-kei
Rahaman, Mohammad M.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS, 2013, 67 : 24 - 54
[9] WHEN THE CEOS INVOLVEMENT IS UNWANTED
REITZFELD, M
JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, 1990, 41 (12): : 19 - 19
[10] Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance?
Galema, Rients
Lensink, Robert
Mersland, Roy
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, 2012, 49 (04) : 718 - 742

← 1 2 3 4 5 →