Design for the environment;
Environmental quality;
Eco-efficiency cooperative game;
Fenchel conjugate core;
Green marketing policy;
FREE-RIDER;
SUPPLY CHAIN;
PRODUCT DESIGN;
PUBLIC-GOODS;
MANAGEMENT;
ALLOCATION;
JUSTICE;
WASTE;
CONSUMERISM;
ENVIRONMENT;
D O I:
10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.09.003
中图分类号:
T [工业技术];
学科分类号:
08 ;
摘要:
Recent regulations often mandate the recycling of scrap products, especially electrical wastes. This study demonstrates how this end-of-pipe enforcement can be converted to an effective policy tool in improving product design towards green product. We show that collective recycling can enhance producer responsibility whilst being affordable for coalition participants by adopting the proposed two-part allocation scheme, which is a particular solution of the underlying cooperative game and is closer to the nucleolus than the Owen set. Practically, our scheme is easier to implement than other core solutions. This scheme can establish institutional trust and promote environmental quality for companies participating in a recycling coalition. The goal of promoting green market is achieved through the implicit cooperation of participating companies.