Research on Laser Injection Attack for AES Based on Micro-Controller Unit

被引:1
|
作者
Jiang HuiLong [1 ,2 ]
Zhu Xiang [1 ,2 ]
Li Yue [1 ]
Ma Yingqi [1 ]
Shangguan Shipeng [1 ,2 ]
Han Jianwei [1 ]
Cai Ying [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Acad Sci, Natl Space Sci Ctr, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
关键词
Fault attack; Micro-Controller Unit (MCU); Advanced Encryption Standard (AES); Laser injection; SRAM; DIFFERENTIAL FAULT ATTACK;
D O I
10.11999/JEIT200163
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
The security of cryptosystem is threatened by fault attacks, and implementation of fault attacks for crypto chips become an important research direction in the field of cryptography and hardware security. The pulse laser is a method with high accuracy for its high temporal-spatial resolution. In this paper, the principle and method of laser injection attacks are described in detail, and experiments are carried out on a Micro-Controller Unit (MCU) with AES-128 algorithm as an example. The SRAMs of the MCU are taken as the attack targets. Differential fault attack and the subkey expansion attack are successfully implemented, and the 16 Byte complete keys are recovered respectively. The latter attack is first implemented by the laser. The research shows that laser injection attack has many benefits to meet the requirements of fault attack models, including accurate location of critical data, error injection in any operation, and generation of single bit flip. The laser injection attacks and ciphertext collection can be completed automatically in a short time in a nearly real-life scenario, which has a great threat to the crypto chips.
引用
收藏
页码:1357 / 1364
页数:8
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