Counterfactuals for consequentialists

That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and true consequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausible and popularly endorsed account. But I am way of endorsing this implication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail to capture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contexts of consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allow for the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believe that certain types of straightforward consequentialist reasoning are coherent. I begin by evaluating a pair of morally relevant counterfactuals ina case via David Lewis's account. I then turn to a slight modification of the case, arguing that Lewis's semantic fails to generate the correct truth values of the subjunctive conditionals in the modified case. Finally, I present a modified version of Lewis's semantics that generates the correct results in all of the cases.