On Frege's alleged holism

Developing the ideas of my article On Freges alleged Platonism (Filosofick2 casopis, 4, 2000), in which I rejected the conventional vulgar Platonic assessment of Freges logical work by reference to the impossibility of its plausible interpretation, I envisage this article as the contribution to the proper vindication of the rival holistic perspective, i. e. to such vindication, which could become a self-evident, transparent part of the philosophical tradition. What we have here, I claim, is the same debt which we owe to the presumed, but yet ungrasped linguistic turn. While the assumption of radical Platonism vitiates the essential part of Freges logic-philosophical legacy (the fact of which I urged in my aforementioned paper), the presumption of the semantic holism is on the contrary the tool enabling us to grasp Freges work as a single compact whole an unprecedented attempt at solving the question: What is the arithmetic about?