Economic and social security in the twenty-first century, with attention to Europe

被引:12
|
作者
Drèze, JH [1 ]
机构
[1] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium
来源
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 102卷 / 03期
关键词
social insurance; moral hazard; fiscal competition; intergenerational risk sharing; international risk sharing;
D O I
10.1111/1467-9442.00204
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A partly heuristic attempt is made to explore long-run policies aimed at a second-best compromise between ex ante risk-sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency. Wage subsidies for low-skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated, together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour, between generations and among the countries belonging to EMU. The scope of the policies advocated is limited by considerations of moral hazard, time consistency and fiscal competition. Moreover, estimates of some key economic parameters remain very imprecise. Several avenues of further research are identified.
引用
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页码:327 / 348
页数:22
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