We examine bidder returns at the announcement of a takeover proposal when the target firm is privately held. In stock offers, bidders experience a positive abnormal return, which contrasts with the negative abnormal return typically found for bidders acquiring a publicly traded target. On the other hand, bidders experience no abnormal return in cash offers. Our analysis suggests that the positive wealth effect is related to monitoring activities by target shareholders and, to an extent, reduced information asymmetries.
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Univ Illinois, Dept Managerial Studies, Coll Business Adm, Chicago, IL 60607 USAUniv Illinois, Dept Managerial Studies, Coll Business Adm, Chicago, IL 60607 USA
Ragozzino, Roberto
Reuer, Jeffrey J.
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Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USAUniv Illinois, Dept Managerial Studies, Coll Business Adm, Chicago, IL 60607 USA
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Kennesaw State Univ, Coles Coll Business, Cox Family Enterprise Ctr, Kennesaw, GA 30144 USAKennesaw State Univ, Coles Coll Business, Cox Family Enterprise Ctr, Kennesaw, GA 30144 USA
Astrachan, Joseph H.
Jaskiewicz, Peter
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Kennesaw State Univ, Coles Coll Business, Cox Family Enterprise Ctr, Kennesaw, GA 30144 USAKennesaw State Univ, Coles Coll Business, Cox Family Enterprise Ctr, Kennesaw, GA 30144 USA