Political power and the credibility of government debt

被引：22
|
作者：
Dixit, A [1 ]
Londregan, J
机构：
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Polit Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2000年 / 94卷 / 01期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2684
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
If political power and motives to invest in government bonds are positively correlated across voting groups, then a self-selection equilibrium can arise where the government's promise to repay its debt is credible. We illustrate this using a formal model where the alternative use of wealth is to acquire human capital. Classification Numbers: D72, E60, H63. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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页码：80 / 105
页数：26
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