The article examines the concept "cognition" within the framework of the embodied cognition theory. It shows that the concept "cognition" within the discussed approach differs from the traditional understanding of cognition as a process of gaining knowledge. The classical concept of cognition includes the opposition between the object and the cognizing subject, while the embodied cognition theory seeks to overcome the subject-object dualism, still continuing to use the concept "cognition". The meanings that the authors of the embodied cognition theory put into the concept "cognition" are revealed through the analysis of their texts. Since the scope and the content of the discussed concept is not identical in the works of various authors of this current, two main meanings are revealed and reviewed as they both are equally foundational for the theory of embodied cognition. Using the example of the classic Cartesian thought experiment - the hypothesis of an evil demon - the difference between the two meanings under consideration is shown. Two meanings of cognition are distinguished: broad and narrow. The article concludes that, in a broad sense, cognition is the conceptualizing activity of an embodied agent. In this sense, cognition includes all cognitive activity of an agent and its content. The importance of corporeality in the process of cognition is emphasized precisely for cognition in a broad sense. However, cognition in a narrow sense is an inalienable property of consciousness as the subject's ability to experience the world from the first-person perspective. In this sense, cognition is direct and immediate. It is noted that the use of the word "cognition" in the two different meanings leads to contradictions within the approach. The consequence of this contradiction is the opposition of autopoietic and sensorimotor enactivism, on the one hand, and radical one, on the other. Cognition in a broad sense can have content, it can be true or false depending on how effectively the subject interacts with the environment with its help. Cognition in a narrow sense has no content as indicated by radical enactivism. It is direct, and therefore the truth criteria are not applicable to it. The distinction between these two meanings can help to overcome contradictions which exist in different currents of the embodied cognition theory.
