Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth

被引：2
|
作者：
Perrine, Timothy [1 ]
机构：
[1] Wuhan Univ, Sch Philosophy, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China
来源：
ACTA ANALYTICA-INTERNATIONAL PERIODICAL FOR PHILOSOPHY IN THE ANALYTICAL TRADITION | 2019年 / 34卷 / 04期
关键词：
DEONTOLOGICAL EVIDENTIALISM; ETHICS; OUGHT;
D O I：
10.1007/s12136-019-00382-4
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman's criticisms. I'll argue that Feldman's arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
引用
收藏
页码：515 / 529
页数：15
相关论文
共 50 条
12345