The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods

被引：0
|
作者：
Bei, Xiaohui [1 ]
Lu, Xinhang [1 ]
Manurangsi, Pasin [2 ]
Suksompong, Warut [3 ]
机构：
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Phys & Math Sci, Singapore, Singapore
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Berkeley, CA USA
[3] Univ Oxford, Dept Comp Sci, Oxford, England
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE | 2019年
基金：
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
We investigate the efficiency of fair allocations of indivisible goods using the well-studied price of fairness concept. Previous work has focused on classical fairness notions such as envy-freeness, proportionality, and equitability. However, these notions cannot always be satisfied for indivisible goods, leading to certain instances being ignored in the analysis. In this paper, we focus instead on notions with guaranteed existence, including envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), balancedness, maximum Nash welfare (MNW), and leximin We mostly provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss for allocations satisfying these notions.
引用
收藏
页码：81 / 87
页数：7
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