The parity view and intuitions of neutrality - Reply

被引：2
|
作者：
Broome, John [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Oxford, Oxford, England
来源：
ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY | 2007年 / 23卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1017/S0266267107001277
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：115 / 124
页数：10
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