How to allow for intentionalia in the jungle (A!Meinong, Bertrand!Russell)

In this paper I will first contend that semantically based arguments in favour of or against problematic entities-like those provided, respectively, in a realist Meinongian and in an antirealist Russellian camp-are ultimately inconclusive. Indeed, only genuinely ontological arguments, specifically addressed to prove (or to reject) the existence of entities of a definite kind, suit the purpose. Thus, I will sketch an argument intended to show that there really are entities of an apparently specific kind, i.e. intentionalia, broadly conceived as things that may actually exist as well as actually not exist. Finally, I will try to explain why that argument proves the existence of only some sorts of intentionalia, by showing how this is related to the fact that, as some have correctly maintained, intentionalia have no intrinsic nature.