AI ethics and the banality of evil

被引:4
|
作者
Tajalli, Payman [1 ]
机构
[1] Macquarie Univ, Sydney, NSW, Australia
关键词
Artificial Intelligence; Artificial Thinking; Banality of Evil; CONSCIOUSNESS; THINKING;
D O I
10.1007/s10676-021-09587-x
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
In this paper, I draw on Hannah Arendt's notion of 'banality of evil' to argue that as long as AI systems are designed to follow codes of ethics or particular normative ethical theories chosen by us and programmed in them, they are Eichmanns destined to commit evil. Since intelligence alone is not sufficient for ethical decision making, rather than strive to program AI to determine the right ethical decision based on some ethical theory or criteria, AI should be concerned with avoiding making the wrong decisions, and this requires hardwiring the thinking activity as a prerequisite for decision making.
引用
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页码:447 / 454
页数:8
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