Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China

被引：307
|
作者：
Zhang, Bing [1 ]
Chen, Xiaolan [2 ]
Guo, Huanxiu [3 ]
机构：
[1] Nanjing Univ, Sch Environm, State Key Lab Pollut Control & Resource Reuse, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Sichuan Univ, Sch Econ, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[3] Nanjing Audit Univ, Inst Econ & Finance, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2018年 / 164卷
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Environmental federalism; Central supervision; Water pollution; Regression discontinuity design; China; REGRESSION-DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS; REGULATORY FEDERALISM; POLLUTION; DECENTRALIZATION; COMPETITION; WATER; INCENTIVES; POLICIES; CHOICE; STATES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper draws on a natural experiment generated by the National Specially Monitored Firms (NSMF) program in China to evaluate the effectiveness of central supervision at improving local environmental enforcement. We explore a unique firm-level Chinese Environmental Statistics dataset and utilize a regression discontinuity design to assess the impact of central supervision through the NSMF program on an industrial firm's chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions. The results suggest that central supervision significantly reduces industrial COD emissions by at least 26.8%. These results highlight the substantial room for improvement in Chinese environmental regulations via central supervision. A more flexible environmental decentralization regime and comprehensive central supervision are thus recommended for future reforms. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：70 / 90
页数：21
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