The sensorimotor theory promises a fresh explanation of phenomenal consciousness, for instance of the feeling of experiencing redness (O 'Regan and Noe, 2001; O 'Regan, 2011). But can it also be extended to explaining aspects of phenomenal consciousness which are only possible thanks to culture, thanks to our embeddedness in social practices? In this paper, I argue that the sensorimotor theory is in need of such an extension, and I make a proposal for how this might be accomplished. I concentrate on one example of culturally shaped experiences, namely on feeling socially shaped emotions, and in particular moral emotions, such as resentment, guilt, forgiving someone, etc. (cf. Strawson, 1962). My main suggestion is this: in our case of enculturated humans, our implicit knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies is informed by, and transformed by, sociocultural practices. There are, I suggest, 'sociocultural contingencies', the mastery of which can contribute to one's phenomenal consciousness. For example, in order to have the experience of feeling resentment or guilt, one has (at least paradigmatically) to engage in an actual fight and make use of one's sociocultural skills of blaming someone or of justifying oneself.