A THEORY OF THE CORRUPT KEYNESIAN

被引：0
|
作者：
Aidt, Toke S. [1 ,2 ]
Dutta, Jayasri [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Cambridge, Fac Econ, Cambridge CB3 9DD, England
[2] Univ Cambridge, Jesus Coll, Cambridge CB3 9DD, England
[3] Univ Birmingham, Dept Econ, Birmingham B15 2TT, W Midlands, England
来源：
NEW AND ENDURING THEMES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 5卷
关键词：
Corruption; entry regulation; performance voting; business cycles; GROWTH; PERSISTENCE;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy in a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy. We find that corruption is pro-cyclical and regulation policy is counter-cyclical. Corrupt politicians engage in excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations and behave as if they were Keynesian. We also find that business cycle shocks can induce political instability with politicians losing office in recessions.
引用
收藏
页码：93 / +
页数：3
相关论文
共 50 条
12345