Moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will: Reply to van Inwagen

被引：0

|

作者：

Fischer, JM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 1998年 / 48卷 / 191期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1467-9213.00096

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

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页码：215 / 220

页数：6

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