R&D competition when firms choose variance

被引：30
|
作者：
Cabral, LMB [1 ]
机构：
[1] NYU, New York, NY 10012 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2003年 / 12卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1162/105864003321220760
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I consider an infinite-period race where players choose between low- and high-variance motion technologies. I provide sufficient conditions under which, in equilibrium, the leader chooses a safe technology and the laggard a risky one, thus formalizing the sports intuition that the laggard has nothing to lose. Various examples and empirical implications are presented.
引用
收藏
页码：139 / 150
页数：12
相关论文
共 50 条
12345