ANALYTICITY AND CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY. ON GILLIAN RUSSELL'S ACCOUNT OF TRUTH IN VIRTUE OF MEANING

被引：0

作者：

Losada, Alfonso ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Buenos Aires, CONICET, RA-1053 Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina

来源：

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA | 2014年 / 46卷 / 137期

关键词：

semantics; metasemantics; meaning-assignment; character; reference; DEFENSE;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

An objection is made to Gillian Russell's (2008) attempt to give an account of analyticity in its metaphysical understanding-that is, that a sentence is analytic just in case it is true in virtue of its meaning. The objection focuses on the semantic aspects of the account, arguing that the kind of context sensitivity envisaged in it ends up yielding the disastrous result that no sentence is analytic in the intended manner. Two possible replies to the objection are analyzed and rebutted.

引用

页码：37 / 60

页数：24

共 3 条

[1] Vindicating Analyticity Critical notice of Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel
[J]. DISPUTATIO-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2012, 4 (33): : 495 - 513
[2] LOGIC AND GNOSEOLOGY IN RUSSELL'S PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA AND INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH
Vernant, Denis
[J]. REVUE DE SYNTHESE, 2020, 141 (1-2): : 85 - 105
[3] A logical challenge to correlationism: the Church-Fitch paradox in Husserl's account of fulfilment, truth, and meaning
Bos, Gregor E.
[J]. SYNTHESE, 2024, 203 (06)

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