Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments

被引：15
|
作者：
Lu, Yuanzhu [2 ]
Wright, Julian [1 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Singapore 117548, Singapore
[2] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, China Econ & Management Acad, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2010年 / 28卷 / 03期
关键词：
Collusion; Intertemporal reaction functions; Kinked demand curve; PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; DUOPOLY SUPERGAMES; EQUILIBRIA; OLIGOPOLY; DEMAND; WARS; COMPETITION; STRATEGIES; GAME;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.10.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Tacit collusion is explored under a strategy in which, loosely speaking, firms match the lowest price set by any firm in the previous period. Conditions are provided under which this strategy supports collusive outcomes in a subgame perfect equilibrium. In contrast to traditional results, the highest collusive price is always lower than the monopoly price It corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium price when upward and downward price deviations are matched Our paper provides a game theoretic interpretation of the old kinked demand curve theory which unlike earlier attempts does not depart from standard timing assumptions to do so (C) 2009 Elsevier B V All rights reserved
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页码：298 / 306
页数：9
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