Entropy Loss in PUF-based Key Generation Schemes: The Repetition Code Pitfall

One of the promising usages of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) is to generate cryptographic keys from PUFs for secure storage of key material. This usage has attractive properties such as physical unclonability and enhanced resistance against hardware attacks. In order to extract a reliable cryptographic key from a noisy PUF response a fuzzy extractor is used to convert non-uniform random PUF responses into nearly uniform randomness. Bosch et al. in 2008 proposed a fuzzy extractor suitable for efficient hardware implementation using two-stage concatenated codes, where the inner stage is a conventional error correcting code and the outer stage is a repetition code. In this paper we show that the combination of PUFs with repetition code approaches is not without risk and must be approached carefully. For example, PUFs with min-entropy lower than 66% may yield zero leftover entropy in the generated key for some repetition code configurations. In addition, we find that many of the fuzzy extractor designs in the literature are too optimistic with respect to entropy estimation. For high security applications, we recommend a conservative estimation of entropy loss based on the theoretical work of fuzzy extractors and present parameters for generating 128-bit keys from memory based PUFs.